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THE NEWSWORTHINESS ELEMENT: SHULMAN
V GROUP WPRODS., INC. MUDDIES THE
WATERS
Gary L. Bostwick*
"Neither in what it gives, nor in what it does not give, nor in the
mode of presentation, must the unclouded face of truth suffer
wrong. Comment is free, but facts are sacred. "'
"The business of the law is to make sense of the confusion of
what we call human life--to reduce it to order but at the same
time to give it possibility, scope, even dignity. "2
I. BACKGROUND
On June 1, 1998, the California Supreme Court decided Shulman v.
Group W Productions, Inc.3 pronouncing holdings of great weight in two
major areas of the law of privacy.4 Both holdings are of paramount
importance to the law governing broadcast and print media. Each will
stand as major determinants of media behavior and legal disputes that arise
therefrom. Yet, Shulman's plurality opinion regarding the tort of
publication of private facts is far from clear. This Article focuses on the
controversy and confusion facing publishers, broadcasters, and their
lawyers after Shulman concerning the most slippery of that tort's four
elements of proof: newsworthiness. This Article argues that while
Gary L. Bostwick is a partner of Bostwick & Hoffman, LLP in Santa Monica, California.
He practices in the area of constitutional law and civil rights and liberties, with special expertise
in First Amendment and libel, slander and invasion of privacy litigation, in addition to more
traditional areas of litigation such as complex business disputes including contracts, employment
discrimination, commercial real estate, construction and partnership disputes. He is grateful to
the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal for their
suggestions, editing and understanding.
1. C.P. Scott, A Hundred Years, MANCHESTER GuARDIAN, May 6, 1921, at 359 (marking
the paper's first hundred years); THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 415 (3d ed. 1979).
2. Archibald MacLeish, Apologia, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1508 (1972).
3. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
4. The plurality opinion first focuses on the publication of private facts. Id. at 478-89.
Then the analysis shifts to a discussion on the privacy tort of intrusion. Id. at 489-87.
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Shulman purports to clarify and standardize the law of what is
"newsworthy," it has merely introduced a new muddle, ignored stare
decisis, and left practitioners and the Fourth Estate floundering.
II. THE QUESTIONS POSED
Is the Shulman test for "newsworthiness" a radical departure from the
Kapellas5 standards that have governed California law since 1969? The
Shulman dissent says yes,6 but the plurality opinion denies any change in
the law.7 The "stated test is a natural adaptation of Kapellas to a different
kind of situation . .,."8 Which is correct? Is either? And how does one
behave now?
III. THE METHOD OF THIS ARTICLE
This Article provides a brief background on the tort of publication of
private facts under California law. It then scrutinizes an unpublished
appellate matter, decided before Shulman, using it as a vehicle to
demonstrate typical pre-Shulman reasoning of California cases in a simple
fact setting arising out of a tabloid article. This Article then analyzes the
changes in the law that Shulman brought about, providing a running
commentary of the several opinions on the issue of newsworthiness.
Finally, it reprises the sample tabloid case, using it as a working model to
theorize what the outcome would have been under the new Shulman test.
IV. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS-THE CONTEXT
Everyone who explores the waters of privacy law will find a single
source bubbling at the head of that turgid stream: a law review article by
Warren and Brandeis published in 1890. 9 Most courts and commentators
proclaim that the law of privacy originated with that article.' ° Certainly,
the authors transformed the phrase 'The right to be let alone" into a theory
5. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
6. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 503 (Brown, J., dissenting).
7. See id. at 486.
8. Id. at 486 n.9.
9. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
10. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 646 (Cal. 1994); Burrows v.
Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 596 n.4 (Cal. 1974); Miller v. Murphy, 191 Cal. Rptr. 740, 744
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766-67 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
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of the law of autonomy.'" They cried out at the excesses of their day: "The
press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency .... [M]odern enterprise and invention have, through
invasions upon [man's] privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress,
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.5
1 2
One of the great ironies of the Warren and Brandeis article, when read
today, is that the technological advances complained about consisted of
nothing more than photography published the next day in metropolitan
newspapers. One can only imagine how horrified the two authors might be
in this day and age when hidden cameras and world-wide publications are
commonplace.
Not surprisingly, when a California court first gave birth to its
common law version of the private fact tort, it harkened back to the Warren
and Brandeis article published forty-one years earlier.1 3 "In such an action
a plaintiff does not rely upon the inaccuracy of the content of an article;
instead, he charges that even if accurate the publication of the facts
interferes with his 'right to be let alone.""14
Years later, Dean William L. Prosser categorized privacy invasions
into four categories. 15 One of the categories was the aggravation which
Warren and Brandeis focused upon: public disclosure of private
embarrassing facts. 16  Prosser's work emphasizes a very important
distinction between this tort and defamation. Public disclosure of private
embarrassing facts is most striking in that it penalizes the publication of
truth. The idea of doing so has made courts and commentators nervous and
uncertain for years. The recent Shulman case is no exception. Moreover, it
appears that Shulman exhibits the court's neurosis in its most starkly
silhouetted manifestation to date.
The tort developed in a way that at least three elements were
commonly thought to be required. California law outlined the elements of
the tort as follows: "First, the disclosure of private fact must be a public
disclosure. Second, the facts disclosed must be private facts, and not
public ones. Third, the matter made public must be one which would be
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable [person] of ordinary
sensibilities.'
7
11. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 646-47.
12. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 196.
13. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931); Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 921.
14. Melvin, 297 P. at 93; Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 921.
15. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
16. Id. at 392-98.
17. Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 725 (Cal. 1980) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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When the tort was first made part of California's common law, case
law discussed a privilege that could be raised as a defense to the tort. The
privilege was for any "truthful publication of newsworthy matters."18
However, few could recognize "newsworthy" when they saw it. As late as
1969, the California Supreme Court noted that on a national level, courts
generally had "only hesitantly sketched the boundaries of the 'newsworthy'
category.
19
In California, courts would typically consider a variety of factors to
determine whether a particular incident was newsworthy. These factors
included the following:
1) The social value of the facts published;
2) The depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs;
3) The extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of
public notoriety; and
4) Whether the intrusion into the private life was only slight.20
Very few fixed standards were ever set forth regarding how factors one,
three or four could be put to use as a litmus.
By 1983, the privilege of newsworthiness had been elevated in status
from a defense to an element of proof. A California appellate court
included it as a fourth element in the explication of the public disclosure
tort. "As discerned from the decisions of our courts, the public disclosure
tort contains the following elements: (1) public disclosure (2) of a private
fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable
person and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern."2' Diaz v.
18. Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 921; Melvin, 297 P. at 93.
19. Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 922.
20. Id.
21. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the Diaz court
equated "newsworthy" with "of legitimate public concern." Id. This phrasing has not held
constant. It is of some great moment whether the catch-phrase is "legitimate public concern" or
"legitimate public interest." The Shulman plurality was not clear on this. Fifteen years before
Diaz, the words "public interest" first crept into the lexicon in California in Kapellas, but then
only in the context of a political campaign, a matter arguably "in the public's interest to be
informed about." The term appears again in 1974 in Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanich, Inc.,
118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 376-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) where a man found and returned $240,000. But
here a semantic shift occurred. The public was certainly "interested," even if there was no
element of "public interest" as such in the story. For the first time, the concept of someone
becoming a "public personage" by force of circumstances giving the public a "legitimate interest
in his activities" appeared. Id. at 379. When Diaz defined "newsworthy" as something that was
of "legitimate public concern," it caused a pendulum swing toward that definition in the majority
of cases following Diaz. See Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 768. The leading decision by the California
Supreme Court on the constitutional right of privacy, Hill v. National Collegiate Ass'n, 865 P2d
633 (Cal. 1994), made reference to the common law cause of action for invasion of privacy and
pointed out that the tort included the possibility of a defensive justification such as "legitimate
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Oakland Tribune, Inc.22 found that the superior court had improperly
instructed the jury that the defendants had the burden of proof.23 This case
found that the publication of Diaz's sexual identity, as a transsexual, was
not newsworthy as a matter of law. Diaz had scrupulously kept the surgery
a secret from all but her immediate family and closest friends.24 She never
sought to publicize the surgery.2' Although originally a male, she changed
her name to Toni Ann Diaz. 6 In 1997, she had been elected student body
president of the College of Alameda and was also selected to be the student
body representative to the Peralta Community College Board of Trustees.27
This case is intriguing in that it decided Diaz had a right to be let
alone even though the public was fascinated by her story, and her public
positions made it one of public concern.28  Diaz is only one example of
how matters of legitimate public interest or concern might drag individuals
into the limelight who neither sought publicity nor attempted to avoid it
altogether. 29 But can publishers be designated to choose where to point the
spotlight from their vantage point as sellers of the news? Who ultimately
decides what is legitimate, what is of public concern, and what is of public
interest? And how can one decide? Additionally, a pivotal question was
always lurking in the background of the debate: Are courts the appropriate
fora in which to decide what is or is not newsworthy?30
public interest." Id. at 648. The reference there, however, was clearly to that type of "public
interest" akin to "concern" rather than "titillation." Id.
22. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
23. Id. at 768-69.
24. id. at 765.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Ms. Diaz was outed by a publication stating, "The students at the College of Alameda
will be surprised to learn that their student body president, Toni Diaz, is no lady, but is in fact a
man whose real name is Antonio. 'Now I realize, that in these times, such a matter is no big deal,
but I suspect his female classmates in P.E. 97 may wish to make other showering arrangements."'
Id. at 766.
28. Consider, for example, how important the success story of Ms. Diaz might be to
lowering barriers between transsexuals and the general uninformed public.
29. See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that
news reports about the sexual orientation of a man who saved the President's life were
newsworthy because the information was not private or offensive).
30. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) ("We doubt the wisdom of
committing this task [of deciding 'on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of
"general or public interest" and which do not'] to the conscience of judges.") (citations omitted);
see also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 63 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("stating that newsworthiness" does not properly establish "a measure of order and predictability
in the law that must govern the daily conduct of affairs" and subjects "the press to judicial
second-guessing of the newsworthiness of each item they print."). In his dissent, Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart stated: "[C]ourts [applying a newsworthiness standard would]
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Generally speaking, at the beginning of the 1990s, such was the state
of the law of newsworthiness and its inherent ambiguities in California.
For a society needing clear guidelines, it left much to be desired. But the
law had the virtue of a somewhat straight-line development with only a few
outliers and an accepted lexicon of concepts.
V. THE TABLOID CASE: A SIMPLE CASE OF TOO MUCH TRUTH3'
A. The Facts
In an unpublished California appellate case, a prominent film star
denied widespread rumors that he had fathered more than one illegitimate
child. The denial was published in a magazine of national circulation and
included the star's quote accusing a well-known tabloid of inventing stories
of children other than the one daughter the film star acknowledged. "Those
are just [tabloid] babies."
Three. months later, the accused tabloid published an article which
accurately reported that the film star, contrary to his denial, had also
fathered a son out of wedlock. In addition, the tabloid reported that the
celebrity, in settlement, had purchased an expensive home in the name of
the two-year-old boy bearing his last name, established a million dollar
trust fund for the child, and initially sent the child's mother child support
payments of $2,000 per month.
B. Complaint
The mother ("Jane") of the child ("Johnny") sued the tabloid on her
own behalf and on behalf of Johnny for invasion of privacy. The complaint
did not dispute that the statements published in the article were true.
Among the allegations, the plaintiffs complained of the public disclosure of
private facts.
be required to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject; what
information is relevant to self-government .... The danger such a doctrine portends for freedom
of the press seems apparent." Id., 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall & Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
31. The facts of this example are taken from an actual case in which the author represented
the plaintiffs. The names and other identifying information have been changed or withheld to
protect the privacy of the parties. The California Court of Appeal opinion was unpublished.
Petitions for hearing and certiorari were denied by the California and United States Supreme
Courts. Neither the name of the case nor citations to the record are provided herein, also to
protect the privacy of the participants.
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The plaintiffs alleged in the complaint that they had sought to keep
their relationship to Johnny's father ("John") secret and endeavored to keep
the details of the financial settlement with John private. The tabloid
countered that the plaintiffs' relationship with the world-renowned movie
star per se vitiated any expectations of privacy.32
C. Outcome
The trial court sustained the tabloid's demurrer to all causes of action.
The court of appeals reversed both the public disclosure of private facts
claim and the right of privacy claim based upon the California Constitution.
The court cited Melvin v. Reid 3 and set forth four elements of proof. The
last of these elements required that the private facts lack legitimate public
concern. The court held that the first element of the cause of action, public
disclosure, was not at issue. It then went on to reason as follows with
respect to the remaining three elements.34
1. Private Facts
The second element of the appellate court's test requires a showing
that publicity has been given to matters concerning the private life of the
individual. Private facts have been described as the "intimate details of
one's private life.. .... 3' The Court found that the details of the plaintiffs'
financial affairs were indisputably private facts. The information was not
left open to the public eye, had not previously been made public, and was
not a matter of public record. Courts in California and other jurisdictions
32. The statements in the tabloid were: "And he made the boy a millionaire!"; "And when
Jane found a four-bedroom, three-bath home, it was purchased on March 13, 1992, in Johnny's
name. The 2583 square-foot home has a three-car garage, a concrete driveway, a slate tile roof as
well as yards in the front and back."; "John also told her to start looking for a house and he would
buy it for her and Johnny."; "John gives her a generous allowance every month and she's living
like a queen. She did over S60,000 of remodeling in her house and bought a new Range Rover
that costs about $40,000."; "John started paying her $2,000-a-month support and he paid for the
birth of Johnny."; "He also set up a million-dollar trust fund for Johnny and bought the boy and
Jane a $376,000 house ".... ; "He did it by setting up a special trust for Johnny, said a source.";
"He paid for the birth and has supported his love child and the boy's mom for the last two years.";
and "She believed John was just being nice to her so she wouldn't make a big deal about his new
son to the press." A photograph of the house and Jane's car was captioned, "'John paid for
$376,000 home and Jane's $40,000 Range Rover, insiders say."'
33. 297 P. 91 (1931).
34. The phrasing in the remainder of this section is in the voice of the court of appeal. The
emphasized passages are holdings Shulman has rendered problematic.
35. Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (1987).
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have recognized, in a variety of contexts, that an individual's financial
36affairs are normally a private matter.
2. Highly Offensive and Objectionable to a Reasonable Person with
Ordinary Sensibilities
The third element of the test requires a showing that the disclosure at
issue would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of
ordinary sensibilities. The published facts included details of the plaintiffs'
private financial affairs. Under the circumstances of this case, the court
could not state as a matter of law that a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities would not be highly offended by the publication of such facts.
3. Legitimate Public Concern or 'Newsworthiness'
What is newsworthy is not always clear.37 The complaint alleged the
plaintiffs' desire to keep the published facts private. Therefore, at the
demurrer stage, it must be assumed that the plaintiffs did not willingly enter
into the public sphere. Yet, the law recognizes that individuals are
sometimes unwillingly thrust into the public sphere as a result of their
connection to events which engender great public interest.
In addition, the defendants published numerous details of the
plaintiffs' private financial affairs. The Plaintiffs were private citizens who
never sought to publicize their relationship to the film star. They had a
right "to be let alone." They had a privacy interest in precluding
dissemination of personal information about them. Furthermore, the
plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in their personal
financial affairs.
36. See, e.g., Painting and Drywall Work Preservation Fund v. Department of Housing &
Urban Dev. 936 F.2d 1300, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hopkins v. United States Dep't of Housing &
Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1991) (examining the release of information about private
employees' wages under the Freedom of Information Act); Robyn v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 774
F.Supp. 587, 592 (D. Colo. 1991) (stating that intrusion into private financial matters can form
basis for invasion of privacy claim); Palmisano v. Toth, 624 A.2d 314, 318-319 (R.I. 1993)
(specifying the amount of punitive damages); Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1365 (Cal.
1991) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (discussing discovery of financial matters in connection with a
punitive damages claim); Doyle v. State Bar, 648 P.2d 942, 945 (Cal. 1982) (discussing client's
financial records in attorney's custody); Valley Bank of Nev. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 652,
656 (Cal. 1975) (examining bank records); City of Carmel-by-the-Sca v. Young, 466 P.2d 225,
231 (Cal. 1970) (focusing on public official financial disclosure law); Tollefson v. Price, 430 P.2d
990, 992 (Ore. 1967) (specifying that a publication regarding debt purportedly owed was an
invasion of privacy); Terry York Imports., Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 242 Cal. Rptr.
790, 797 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing automobile dealership records including payroll
records and customer credit applications and reports).
37. See Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 922-24.
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As a matter of law, the loss of privacy resulting from the plaintiffs'
association with a celebrity does not necessarily render their personal
financial affairs newsworthy. The information about the financial support
may be newsworthy, however, the details are not. A trier of fact could
conclude that the amount of money the star gave to the plaintiffs, the price
of their home, the amount of the monthly support payments, and the size of
the child's trust fund, were private facts, the details of which were
unnecessary to the story told and not newsworthy. Given the depth of the
intrusion into the plaintiffs' confidential financial matters and their
attempts to keep their personal affairs private, reasonable minds could
differ as to its newsworthiness. Therefore, the demurrer to the plaintiffs'
cause of action for public disclosure of private facts should not have been
sustained.
D. Analysis of the Application of Law to the Tabloid Case
The tabloid petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari based on those phrases emphasized in italics above. The question
presented was whether privacy law could allow a jury to impose liability if
certain true facts published in an article lacked sufficient "social value" or
if there had been "feasible and effective alternatives" to including those
facts.
The court in the tabloid case effectively said that the article should
have been written or edited differently. It may have been permissible to
write about the fact that John provided support for Jane and Johnny, but the
article should not have given financial details. A trier of fact is allowed to
determine whether those details are "unnecessary to the story told." 3  The
tabloid attempted to utilize this case as a platform to reach the United
States Supreme Court to attack other California decisions that affirmed
liability based on findings of lack of social value or social utility findings. 9
The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari.
VI. THE SHULMAN CASE
At what point does the publishing or broadcasting of otherwise
private words, expressions and emotions cease to be protected
38. Stated another way: If the report as a whole was newsworthy how could the reporting of
details relating to the report be unnecessary and therefore not newsworthy?
39. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971); see Times Mirror v.
Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert. dismissd, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989);
Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Johnson v. Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
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by the press' constitutional and common law privilege--4ts right
to report on matters of legitimate public interest-and become
an unjustified, actionable invasion of the subject's private life?
How can the courts fashion and administer meaningful rules for
protecting privacy without unconstitutionally setting themselves
up as censors or editors?40
A. The Facts
41
On June 24, 1990, the plaintiffs; Ruth and Wayne Shulman, mother
and son, were injured when their car flew off Interstate 10 and tumbled
down an embankment into a drainage ditch on state-owned property,
coming to rest upside down. Ruth, who sustained serious back injuries,
was pinned under the car.
A rescue helicopter operated by Mercy Air was dispatched to the
scene. The flight nurse, who would perform the medical care at the scene
and on the way to the hospital, was Laura Carnahan. Also on board were
the pilot, a medic, and Joel Cooke, a video camera operator employed by
the defendants Group W Productions, Inc. and 4MN Productions. Cooke
was recording the rescue operation for later broadcast.
Cooke roamed the accident scene, videotaping the rescue. Nurse
Carnahan wore a wireless microphone that picked up her conversations
with both Ruth and the other rescue personnel. Cooke's tape was edited
into a piece approximately nine minutes long, which, with the addition of
narrative voice-over, was broadcast on September 29, 1990, as a segment
of On Scene: Emergency Response.
The videotape shows only a glimpse of Wayne. His voice is never
heard. Ruth is shown several times, either by brief shots of a limb or her
torso, or with her features blocked by others or obscured by an oxygen
mask. She is also heard speaking several times. Carnahan calls her
"Ruth," but her last name is not mentioned on the broadcast.
While Ruth is still trapped under the car, Carnahan asks Ruth's age.
Ruth responds, "I'm old." On further questioning, Ruth reveals she is 47,
and Carnahan states "it's all relative. You're not that old." During her
extrication from the car, Ruth asks at least twice if she is dreaming. At one
point she asks Carnahan, who has told her she will be taken to the hospital
40. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 474 (Cal. 1998).
41. This section is a direct reproduction of the facts as they are stated by the California
Supreme Court in Shulman. For the sake of reader clarity and comprehension, each reproduction
is not cited. The reader should refer to Shulman, 955 P.2d at 475-77, as authority for the
replication of these facts.
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in a helicopter: "Are you teasing?" At another point she says: "This is
terrible. Am I dreaming?" She also asks what happened and where the rest
of her family is, repeating the questions even after being told she was in an
accident and the other family members are being cared for. While being
loaded into the helicopter on a stretcher, Ruth says: "I just want to die."
Carnahan reassures her that she is "going to do real well," but Ruth repeats:
"I just want to die. I don't want to go through this."
Ruth and Wayne are placed in the helicopter, and its door is closed.
The narrator states, "Once airborne, Laura and [the flight medic] will
update their patients' vital signs and establish communications with the
waiting trauma teams at Loma Linda." Carnahan, speaking into what
appears to be a radio microphone, transmits some of Ruth's vital signs and
states that Ruth cannot move her feet and has no sensation. The video
footage during the helicopter ride includes a few seconds of Ruth's face,
covered by an oxygen mask. Wayne is neither shown nor heard.
The helicopter lands on the hospital roof. As Ruth is being taken out,
she states, "My upper back hurts." Carnahan replies: "Your upper back
hurts. That's what you were saying up there." Ruth states, "I don't feel
that great." Carnahan responds, "You probably don't."
Finally, Ruth is shown being moved from the helicopter into the
hospital. The narrator concludes by stating: "Once inside both patients
will be further evaluated and moved into emergency surgery if need be.
Thanks to the efforts of the crew of Mercy Air, the firefighters, the medics
and the police who responded, the patients' lives were saved." As the
segment ends, a brief, written epilogue appears on the screen, stating;
"Laura's patient spent months in the hospital. She suffered severe back
injuries. The others were all released much sooner."
The accident left Ruth a paraplegic. When the segment was
broadcast, Wayne phoned Ruth in her hospital room and told her to turn on
the television because "Channel 4 is showing our accident now." Shortly
afterward, several hospital workers came into the room to mention that a
videotaped segment of her accident was being shown. Ruth was "shocked,
so to speak, that this would be run and I would be exploited, have my
privacy invaded, which is what I felt had happened." She did not know her
rescue had been recorded in this manner and had never consented to its
recording or broadcast. Ruth had the impression from the broadcast "that I
was kind of talking nonstop, and I remember hearing some of the things I
said, which were not very pleasant." At a deposition, when she was asked
what part of the broadcast material she considered private, Ruth explained:
I think the whole scene was pretty private. It was pretty
gruesome, the parts that I saw, my knee sticking out of the car. I
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certainly did not look my best, and I don't feel it's for the public
to see. I was not at my best in what I was thinking and what I
was saying and what was being shown, and it's not for the
public to see this trauma that I was going through.
B. The Plurality Opinion on the Issue of Newsworthiness
Justice Werdegar wrote the plurality opinion42 with Chief Justice
George and Justice Kennard concurring. 4 Justice Kennard concurred
separately in the judgment, however, refusing to adopt the reasoning of the
other justices. 44 She did not believe the plurality opinion's rule of liability
was consonant with some aspects of the United States Supreme Court's
current First Amendment jurisprudence. 45  Justice Mosk joined her
concurrence. Justice Chin concurred separately on the issue of private facts
without adding anything of substance to the analysis. 46 Justice Mosk also
joined this concurrence.47 Tallying all the votes and concurrences, one can
see that the articulation of the law in California regarding newsworthiness
has the full approval of only three Justices of the California Supreme Court
(Werdegar, the Chief Justice and Chin).
The court itself was so divided, it is puzzling why Justice Werdegar
stated in the plurality opinion that the area regarding the private facts tort is
relatively settled. 4  She stated, 'The claim that a publication has given
unwanted publicity to allegedly private aspects of a person's life is one of
the more commonly litigated and well-defined areas of privacy law. ' 4 9
That introduction was a harbinger of more contradictions to come.
Nonetheless, some matters are clear in the opinion. First, lack of
newsworthiness is firmly ensconced as an element of the tort, not a defense
to it.5 0 Second, the newsworthiness analysis requires a balancing of the
42. Id. at 473.
43. id. at 499.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 499.
46. "I concur in part I of the plurality opinion. The newsworthy nature of the disclosure
absolutely precludes a plaintiffs' recovery under this theory, and summary judgment for the
defendants on this cause of action was therefore proper." Id. at 501 (Chin, J., concurring).
47. It is unexplained how Justice Mosk could concur with one opinion that called into
question the opinion of the plurality about private facts and simultaneously concur in another
opinion that joined the plurality without reservation as to the private facts tort. Justice Mosk
apparently concurred with Justice Kennard's reservations as to the plurality's opinion on private
facts, but agreed with Justice Chin's dissent regarding intrusion. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 501-02.
48. Id. at 478.
49. Id.
50. See id.
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interests in personal privacy and freedom of the press.5 In this case, where
the facts disclosed were not in great disproportion to the public's right to
know, the broadcast was found to be newsworthy, thus barring liability
under the private facts tort.52
However, on other issues, clarity of the opinion fades. The plurality
opinion realized that to simply say that the plaintiff must establish a lack of
newsworthiness or lose the case was only the beginning of the analysis. "It
is in the determination of newsworthiness-in deciding whether published
or broadcast material is of legitimate public concern-that courts must
struggle most directly to accommodate the conflicting interests of
individual privacy and press freedom. 53
At this point, the plurality opinion made one conclusion relatively
certain-the terms "legitimate public concern" and "legitimate public
interest" are identical to the term "newsworthiness." No distinction
appears between "concern" or "interest." The plurality treats them as
interchangeable. 4
Next, the plurality opinion made certain that the constitutional
defense of newsworthiness dictated by federal court decisions 55 was
congruent with the concept of recognizing the lack of newsworthiness as a
necessary element of the California common law private facts tort. "Tort
liability, obviously, can extend no further than the First Amendment
allows; conversely, we see no reason or authority for fashioning the
newsworthiness element of the private facts tort to preclude liability where
the Constitution would allow it."
56
The plurality then complained that the United States Supreme Court
had not given "extensive attention" to the constitutional privilege. 57 After
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
54. It became apparent later in the plurality opinion, when the court applied the facts of the
Shulman accident to its new-found test, that the reason the plurality drew no distinction was
because they saw no distinction between the words "concern" and "interest." The plurality stated
that the broadcast was of public concern because automobile accidents are of interest, because
rescue and medical treatment is a critical service that any member of the public may someday
need and because the broadcast highlighted some of the challenges facing emergency workers.
Id. at 488.
55. Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1989); Campbell v.
Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa.
1976); see Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv.
1205 (1976).
56. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
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discussing the Supreme Court cases of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 8
and Florida Star v. BJ.F.,59 the plurality concluded that neither case
provides,
general guidance as to what is, and is not, 'a matter of public
significance'69-what is newsworthy, in other words-or as to
when, if ever, the protection of private facts against public
disclosure should be considered a sufficiently important state
interest to justify civil liability pursuant to the common law
tort.
61
The plurality even voiced an ominous suggestion that the tort of public
disclosure of private facts may not even exist.
62
The plurality ultimately concluded that the Supreme Court had left
California and the other states at sea, stating, "[t]he decisions do not,
however, enunciate a general test of newsworthiness applicable to other
factual circumstances or provide a broad theoretical basis for discovery of
such a general constitutional standard.'
63
The plurality then launched upon ruminations in the realm of
sociological decision theory, stating:
newsworthiness-constitutional or common law-is... difficult
to define because it may be used as either a descriptive or a
normative term. "Is the term 'newsworthy' a descriptive
predicate, intended to refer to the fact there is widespread public
interest? Or is it a value predicate, intended to indicate that the
publication is a meritorious contribution and that the public's
interest is praiseworthy?" 64
Either extreme has undesirable consequences. If the definition is
descriptive-"if all coverage that sells papers or boosts ratings is deemed
58. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
59. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
60. It is worth noting that a third synonym for newsworthiness entered the plurality's
lexicon in this comment: "public significance." Shulman, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 481.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citations omitted). The plurality may be faulted for not deciding about whether
"newsworthiness" is properly used only as a descriptive term or only as a normative term. The
plurality points to the "difficulty of finding a workable standard in the middle ground" that has
led to considerable variation in past judicial descriptions of the newsworthiness concept. This
may allow the inference that the plurality's holding is that the middle ground is where the
workable standard must be. This inference is borne out by the manner in which the plurality later
applied the facts of the case to the law it had developed. Id. at 488-89.
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newsworthy" 6---the private facts tort would be swallowed up.
66 On the
other hand, if the definition is normative, courts could become editors and
guardians of public taste. "The difficulty of finding a workable standard in
the middle ground between the extremes of normative and descriptive
analysis, and the variety of factual circumstances in which the issue has
been presented, have led to considerable variation in judicial descriptions
of the newsworthiness concept., 67 One commentator noted that this test
"bears an enormous social pressure, and it is not surprising to find that the
common law is deeply confused and ambivalent about its application.,
68
The plurality then attempted to find a path of safety in the struggle
between morals and public appetites.69
First, the analysis of newsworthiness does involve courts to
some degree in a normative assessment of the "social value" of a
publication. All material that might attract readers or viewers is
not, simply by virtue of its attractiveness, of legitimate public
interest. Second, the evaluation of newsworthiness depends on
the degree of intrusion and the extent to which the plaintiff
played an important role in public events, and thus on a
comparison between the information revealed and the nature of
the activity or event that brought the plaintiff to public attention.
"Some reasonable proportion is ... to be maintained between
the events or activity that makes the individual a public figure
and the private facts to which publicity is given. Revelations
that may properly be made concerning a murderer or the
President of the United States would not be privileged if they
were to be made concerning one who is merely injured in an
automobile accident." 70
There are apparently still limits, even if an item is newsworthy. The
plurality conceded that a person who is involuntarily involved in a
65. Id. at481.
66. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 481.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing to Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort, 77 COL. L. REv. 957, 1007 (1989)).
69. It should be noted that although the plurality earlier referred to the tort as one of the
more well-defined areas of privacy law, in the discussion of normative standards versus
descriptive standards, it recognized the difficulty of finding a workable standard between the
extremes had led to considerable variation in judicial descriptions of the newsworthiness concept,
this left the common law deeply confused and ambivalent," which is a far cry from "well-
defined." Id. at 478.
70. Id. at 483-84 (citations omitted); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h
(1976).
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newsworthy incident does not give up all rights to privacy, and not
everything that the person says or does is newsworthy.
Most persons are connected with some activity, vocational or
avocational, as to which the public can be said as a matter of law
to have a legitimate interest or curiosity. To hold as a matter of
law that private facts as to such persons are also within the area
of legitimate public interest could indirectly expose everyone's
private life to public view.
The plurality lists with seeming approval earlier decisions holding
that certain publications about persons involuntarily involved in a
newsworthy incident were an unnecessary invasion of privacy only when
they added nothing of significance to the story.72 The opinion then
implicitly endorses the concept of judges and juries acting as editors. No
other conclusion is possible.
After setting forth the historical path that brought the law to its
current state, the plurality opinion moved into uncharted territory, inviting
alarm and scorn in the dissenting opinion by Justice Brown. For the first
time under California law, and relying principally on federal cases, the
plurality introduced the concept of requiring a "logical nexus" between the
plaintiff and the subject matter of the publication.
The contents of the publication or broadcast are protected only if
they have "some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate
public interest." Thus, recent decisions have generally tested
newsworthiness with regard to [limited public figures] by
assessing the logical relationship or nexus, or the lack thereof,
between the events or activities that brought the person into the
public eye and the particular facts disclosed.73
The plurality explained that privacy is to be protected whenever the
material revealed ceases to have any substantial connection to the subject
matter of the newsworthy report. 74 Furthermore, it believed that this is in
accordance with the widely-held view that a legitimate public interest does
not include "a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own
71. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 484.
72. Id.; see Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that revealing that a candidate for the office of student body president was transsexual,
had "little if any connection between the information disclosed and [the student's] fitness for
office"); Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. 3d 1996) (holding that "a
mother's private words over the body of her slain son as it lay in a hospital room were held
nonnewsworthy despite undisputed legitimate public interest in the subjects of gang violence and
murder.").
73. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 484-85 (citations omitted).
74. Id.
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sake" nor the mere "voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy that
surrounds a stranger. ' M The plurality opined that its new rule measuring
newsworthiness about a person involuntarily drawn into a matter of public
interest by determining the relevance of the facts to the newsworthy subject
avoided the undesirable balancing of interests in an "ad hoc fashion in each
case. '76 Finally, it warned that there are always exceptions to the rule that
newsworthiness exists when a logical nexus exists between the event and
the facts revealed. In spite of the existence of a logical nexus, courts and
juries would be allowed to find that the intrusiveness of the revelation was
greatly disproportionate to its relevance.
To many this seems to be "balancing interests in ad hoc fashion,"
precisely what the plurality wished to avoid.
In general, it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular
story is best covered. The constitutional privilege to publish
truthful material "ceases to operate only when an editor abuses
his broad discretion to publish matters that are of legitimate
public interest." By confining our interference to extreme cases,
the courts "avoid . . . unduly limiting.., the exercise of
effective editorial judgment." Nor is newsworthiness governed
by the tastes or limited interests of an individual judge or juror; a
publication is newsworthy if some reasonable members of the
community could entertain a legitimate interest in it.
77
On the other hand, no mode of analyzing newsworthiness
can be applied mechanically or without consideration of its
proper boundaries. To observe that the newsworthiness of
private facts about a person involuntarily thrust into the public
eye depends, in the ordinary case, on the existence of a logical
nexus between the newsworthy event or activity and the facts
revealed is not to deny that the balance of free press and privacy
interests may require a different conclusion when the
intrusiveness of the revelation is greatly disproportionate to its
relevance. Intensely personal or intimate revelations might not,
in a given case, be considered newsworthy, especially where
75. Id. at 485, 488.
76. Id. at 483 (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard, of course, in her concurring
opinion disagreed that this objective had been achieved while suggesting that the only
constitutional way to judge these kinds of cases was on a "case-by-case adjudication method." Id.
at 500.
77. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
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they bear only slight relevance to a topic of legitimate public
concern.
78
The plurality then applied the facts of this case to the law it had just
announced. As in so many cases, it is from this application that the true
meaning of the new law is to be derived. The court began by agreeing with
the defendants that the broadcast's subject matter was of legitimate public
concern. The auto accident as well as the rescue and medical treatment of
the victims were of legitimate public concern. Ruth's story, in particular,
was of interest because of the difficult extrication from her car, the medical
attention she received at the scene, and her helicopter evacuation which
highlighted the challenges that emergency workers face when dealing with
serious accidents. 79
The more difficult question is whether Ruth's appearance and
words as she was extricated from the overturned car, placed in
the helicopter and transported to the hospital were of legitimate
public concern. Pursuant to the analysis outlined earlier, we
conclude the disputed material was newsworthy as a matter of
law. One of the dramatic and interesting aspects of the story as
a whole is its focus on flight nurse Carnahan, who appears to be
in charge of communications with other emergency workers, the
hospital base and Ruth, and who leads the medical assistance to
Ruth at the scene. Her work is portrayed as demanding and
important and as involving a measure of personal risk (e.g., in
crawling under the car to aid Ruth despite warnings that gasoline
may be dripping from the car). The broadcast segment makes
apparent that this type of emergency care requires not only
medical knowledge, concentration and courage, but an ability to
talk and listen to severely traumatized patients. One of the
challenges Carnahan faces in assisting Ruth is the confusion,
pain and fear that Ruth understandably feels in the aftermath of
the accident. For that reason the broadcast video depicting
Ruth's injured physical state (which was not luridly shown) and
audio showing her disorientation and despair were substantially
relevant to the segment's newsworthy subject matter.
The plaintiffs argue that showing Ruth's "intimate private,
medical facts and her suffering was not necessary to enable the
public to understand the significance of the accident or the
rescue as a public event." The standard, however, is not
78. id. at 486 (citations omitted).
79. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488.
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necessity. That the broadcast could have been edited to exclude
some of Ruth's words and images and still excite a minimum
degree of viewer interest is not determinative. Nor is the
possibility that the members of this or another court, or a jury,
might find a differently edited broadcast more to their taste or
even more interesting. The courts do not, and constitutionally
could not, sit as superior editors of the press.
The challenged material was thus substantially relevant to
the newsworthy subject matter of the broadcast and did not
constitute a "morbid and sensational prying into private lives for
its own sake." Nor can we say the broadcast material was so
lurid and sensational in emotional tone, or so intensely personal
in content, as to make its intrusiveness disproportionate to its
relevance. Under these circumstances, the material was, as a
matter of law, of legitimate public concern.80
The plurality further explained that while the broadcast was of
legitimate interest, Ruth's images and sounds were not. Although Ruth
was identified by her first name, voice and general appearance, her face
was never directly displayed.8' Nevertheless, without her image and voice,
the video documentary of the rescue and medical treatment would have lost
its legitimate descriptive and narrative impact.82 The plurality disagreed
with Justice Brown's characterization of its test as being a "radical
departure" from the former law. Instead, the test is "a natural adaptation of
Kapellas to a different kind of situation, one involving a private figure
involuntarily caught up in a newsworthy event. "83 Although the plurality
felt its analysis was a natural adaptation of former law, clearly a new
standard of newsworthiness had been forged. Thus the event was not an
occasion for celebration by all members of the court.
C. The Dissent of Justice Brown, Joined by Justice Baxter
Justice Brown dissented," stating she would have remanded the
private facts case to the trial court. Her reputation as a trenchant critic was
not stained by her dissent. She accused the plurality of making new law,
then failing to follow it.
80. Id. at 488 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 489.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 486 n.9 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 502-04.
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Ironically, the plurality begins its discussion of the publication
of private facts cause of action by describing it as "one of the
more... well-defined areas of privacy law." While that may
have been an accurate description before today's extended
exegesis, it is certainly no longer the case. After paying lip
service to this court's well-established, scholarly precedents, the
plurality proceeds to ignore their test for assessing
newsworthiness. Worse yet, the new test adopted in the plurality
opinion seriously compromises personal privacy by rendering
otherwise private facts newsworthy whenever they bear a
"logical relationship" to a matter of legitimate public concern,
even in situations where the news media obtains the private facts
by deceptive and unlawful means.85
Justice Brown agreed with the plurality on the historical development
of the newsworthy element, accepting the Diaz court's characterization and
ignoring the idea that the concept was once considered as a defense.
However, Justice Brown was convinced that "a straightforward application
of the Kapellas newsworthiness test leads to one inescapable conclusion-
that, at the very least, there are triable issues of material fact on the
question of newsworthiness. '8 6 There was no legitimate public interest in
Ruth's disorientation, despair, and innermost thoughts.17 The broadcast
substantially intruded into Ruth's private affairs. 8
The dissent not only accused the plurality of deviating from
established law to adopt their own test, but also of misapplying their own
test. 9 This misapplication led to the erroneous conclusion that there are no
triable issues of material fact. 9°
Justice Brown pointed to the fundamental shift of the law of
newsworthiness in California. In her view, privacy has lost ground to the
First Amendment. 9'
Under the plurality's new test, personal privacy must yield
whenever the overall subject matter of a broadcast is
newsworthy and the private facts disclosed bear a "logical
relationship" to that subject matter. Thus, to "[t]he more
difficult question [of] whether Ruth's appearance and words as
85. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 502 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 502-03 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 503.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citations omitted).
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 503.
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she was extricated from the overturned car, placed in the
helicopter and transported to the hospital were of legitimate
public concern," the plurality offers the facile answer that they
were because "her disorientation and despair were substantially
relevant to the segment's newsworthy subject matter. ' 92
While the disagreement between the plurality and the dissent was
significant, criticism was harsh from the other end of the spectrum as well.
Justice Kennard's concurrence, joined by Justice Mosk, sounded very much
like a dissent.
93
D. The Concurrence of Justice Kennard, Joined by Justice Mosk
While Justice Kennard agreed that the summary judgment was
properly entered against plaintiffs, she felt that the plurality should have
examined the potential conflict between personal privacy interests and the
freedoms of speech and press, in light of the chilling effect its test may
have on First Amendment speech.
The plurality opinion tries to balance these two values by using
the concept of newsworthiness to define a general limit on the
scope of tort liability for disclosure of private facts; it
acknowledges only a "theoretical risk" that the tort would
intrude on expression protected by the First Amendment. I am
not so sanguine. 94
The concurring opinion expresses a concern that the subjective
thinking engaged in by courts and juries will lead inevitably to content-
based restrictions on speech. "[T]he point of all speech protection is... to
shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided,
or even hurtful., 95 While content-based restrictions are permitted, they
must be "justified by a 'compelling' state interest and be the least
restrictive means of achieving that interest.' '96 The United States Supreme
Court, without ever determining if the publication of lawfully obtained,
truthful private facts may ever be punished, has held that punishment must
be narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.97
Justice Kennard then suggested that the newsworthiness test adopted
by the plurality might make the entire tort of publication of private facts
92. Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 498-501.
94. id. at 498-99 (citations omitted).
95. ld. at 499 (citations omitted).
96. Id.
97. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 499. (citing to Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989)).
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unconstitutional. She noted that "the individual or social harmfulness of
speech with a particular content is rarely a justification for suppressing
it.
, , 8
Justice Kennard thereafter heaped scorn upon two sacred tenets of
California jurisprudence in the field of publication of private facts, Melvin99
and Briscoe. 10 Both Melvin and Briscoe "permitted the plaintiffs to bring
claims for the publication of the fact that, as shown in official public
records, they had been tried for (and, in Briscoe, convicted of) crimes many
years before."' 0 ' Justice Kennard doubts that these holdings would survive
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,1°2 which held that "the First and
Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for
truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court
records."1
03
Certainly, a widespread application of Briscoe could
significantly alter the practice of biography and history, for even
in the case of notable figures much of what occurs in their
private lives may have faded from the public mind and, under
the plurality opinion's test, may no longer be newsworthy by the
time the biographer or historian arrives on the scene.
1°4
Justice Kennard speculated that the United States Supreme Court
might someday decide that private facts, like obscenity or advertisements,
should have less constitutional protections than other types of speech.0 s
"In particular, the 'newsworthiness' standard makes liability turn on the
sort of content-based subjective value judgments that have long been
anathema in the United States Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. ' ' 0 6
Finally, Justice Kennard suggested that the Shulman plurality should
not have attempted to make new law and that courts should proceed
98. Id
99. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
100. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971). This statement in the
concurrence is a significant red flag raised for all practitioners who may place reliance upon the
two opinions.
101. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 500.
102. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
103. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 500 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496
(1975)); see Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (holding that "once the
truthful information was 'publicly revealed' or 'in the public domain' the court could not
constitutionally restrain its dissemination").
104. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 500.
105. See id.
106. Id.
1999] SHULMAN V. GROUP W PRODS., INC. MUDDIES THE WATERS 247
carefully and on a case by case basis, restricting every holding to discrete
factual contexts. 10 7 She referred again to the United States Supreme Court:
The tension between the right which the First Amendment
accords to a free press, on the one hand, and the protections
which various statutes and common-law doctrines accord to
personal privacy against the publication of truthful information,
on the other, is a subject we have addressed several times in
recent years.... [A]lthough our decisions have without
exception upheld the press' right to publish, we have
emphasized each time that we were resolving this conflict only
as it arose in a discrete factual context."0 8
Justice Kennard prophesied that the plurality's newsworthiness rule
might require retooling if a case arose with different facts that called out for
affirming liability.' °9 Of course, this hardly adds to the sense of confidence
of those hoping to rely on the solidity of this newsworthiness rule.
At the end of the fray, California was left with an opinion that was
eagerly expected and widely read across the nation. 10 While the waiting
suspense had ended, a new kind of suspense ensued. It is helpful to review
the results.
E. A List of Standards and Touchstones for Newsworthiness in Shulman
1. Courts as Editors
"The courts do not ... sit as superior editors of the press."' It is
difficult to see how the broadcast could have completely avoided any
possible identification without undercutting its legitimate descriptive and
narrative impact."2 A degree of truthful detail in the Shulman video was
not only relevant but seemed essential to the narrative. 3
107. Id.
108. Id. at 500 (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1988)).
109. Id. at 500-01.
110. See, e.g., Max Frankel, When is Private Pain a Public Gooa N.Y. TIMVEs, July 5, 1998,
§ 6, at 12; Suit Against TVShow Proceeds, THE DAILY RECORD, June 3, 1998, at 3C.
111. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488.
112. Id. at 489.
113. Id.
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2. What Is Newsworthy?
Newsworthiness is identical to "legitimate public interest,"
"legitimate public concern," or "a matter of public significance."'" 4 A
publication is newsworthy if some reasonable members of the community
could entertain a legitimate interest in it."' For example, automobile
accidents are of interest to the traveling public. 16 The rescue and medical
treatment of accident victims is of legitimate concern, because many people
may someday need the service.
17
The story of Ruth Shulman's situation was of particular interest
because it highlighted some of the challenges facing emergency workers
dealing with serious accidents."' The video depicting Ruth's state of
injury, disorientation, and despair was substantially relevant to the
newsworthy. The video depicting Ruth's state of injury, disorientation, and
despair was substantially relevant to the newsworthy subject matter. One
of the most dramatic and interesting aspects of the story was flight nurse
Carnahan's behavior due to the challenges she faced on account of the
confusion, pain and fear that Ruth Shulman understandably felt. The
Shulman video was not lurid." 9.
In the case of facts disclosed about a person involuntarily drawn into
an event, something is newsworthy if it bears a logical relationship to the
subject of the broadcast and is not intrusive in great disproportion to its
relevance. 20 In essence, a logical nexus has to exist between the plaintiff
and the newsworthy event.12
3. Balancing Is Inevitable
The court must to some degree consider the "social value" of a
publication. 22 Whether something is newsworthy depends on the degree
of intrusion and the extent to which the plaintiff played an important role in
the public events in general.
23
114. Id. at 478-81, 483-84, 486.
115. Id. at 485.
116. Id. at 488.
117. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 478.
121. Id. at 484-86.
122. Id. at 483.
123. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 484.
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If the intrusiveness of the revelation is greatly disproportionate to its
relevance, a publication cannot be newsworthy. 24 Something that is
newsworthy cannot be "a morbid and sensational prying into private lives
for its own sake."'25
Intensely personal or intimate revelations might not, in a given case,
be considered newsworthy, especially where they bear only slight
relevance to the newsworthy topic. 26 The broadcast material was not so
lurid and sensational as to make its intrusiveness disproportionate to its
relevance. 1
27
When a person is involuntarily involved in a newsworthy incident,
not all aspects of the person's life and not everything the person says or
does is newsworthy. If the facts published add nothing of significance to
the story, the facts are unnecessary. 21 You cannot say that a fact does not
have a logical nexus simply because it was not necessary to the
publication. 1
2 9
VII. THE TABLOID CASE REVISITED USING SHULMAN STANDARDS
The tabloid case discussed above is a paradigm and a simple test case
with controlled variables. All of the matters were true. The tabloid simply
published too much. The question essentially was whether the editor
should have excluded those portions of the article that published the details
of the plaintiffs' financial affairs. How would the tabloid case fare under
the new Shulman rules?
A. Shulman Mandates Liability
Jane was involuntarily drawn into the controversy. Thus, not all
aspects of her and her son's life are rendered newsworthy. Arguably, the
amount of money in the trust fund and the price of the house added nothing
of significance to the story. Their publication was therefore unnecessarily
invasive. Further, one could argue that the intrusiveness of the revelation is
greatly disproportionate to its relevance. The publication of financial
details is traditionally considered very intrusive by courts.130 Given the
tradition of protection of financial privacy in California, the tabloid article
124. Id. at 486.
125. Id. at 485, 488 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 486.
127. Id. at 488.
128. Id. at 484.
129. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 488.
130. See note 36 and accompanying text.
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appears to be a publication of intimate revelations. The actual details seem
to bear only a slight relevance to the topic that is of legitimate public
concern. Thus, the new Shulman test as applied above would not change
the outcome at all and the plaintiffs would win. However, there is a
different way of looking at the tabloid paradigm through the Shulman lens.
B. Shulman Mandates No Liability
Under Shulman, the publication as a whole would be found
newsworthy because reasonable members of the community "could
entertain a legitimate interest in it." '131 Certainly celebrities and their
illegitimate children, by their nature, are of interest to a great portion of the
public. The issue of celebrities telling lies about their lives may be of
legitimate concern to much of the public. There is an obvious logical
nexus between the plaintiffs and the matter of legitimate public interest. It
is not considered a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its
own sake to publish the amounts and details of the financial arrangements.
The issue of deadbeat dads and the support of their children in general is
probably of legitimate concern. The mere fact that it wasn't "necessary" to
put in all the details is not important. The financial details appear
substantially relevant to the entire subject in the same way that Ruth
Shulman's injuries related to that broadcast. The use of the truthful detail
would seems to be both relevant and essential to the narrative.
Justice Kennard's concurrence suggested that no fixed rules can or
should be set forth in this area. Yet, the plurality was insistent upon setting
forth rules that could be used as guidelines for the media, writers,
publishers, editors, broadcasters, producers and counsel. Using the
example tabloid scenario to test the efficiency of Shulman in that regard,
Shulman is a failure. The case could come out either way using the
Shulman analysis.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the tension between privacy and liberty, safeguards devised for
privacy generally damage freedom of the press, and vice versa. The tug-of-
war comprises what is known as a "zero-sum game," any gain in favor of
one concept causes a concomitant loss of equal value to the other. It may
be a widely accepted tenet in American law and journalism that facts are
sacred, but it is not nearly so clear in the law or in the world at large that
131. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485.
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the unfettered expression of all facts about anyone and everyone is
tolerable to society.
The Shulman opinion was eagerly awaited by counsel, news editors,
reporters and scholars in the hopes that the California Supreme Court
would develop--or at least clarify--the rules of engagement between the
two sacred concepts. The decision, with its resulting variation of concepts,
left almost everyone disappointed. The contradictions among the opinions
of the shifting pluralities of the court left one wishing that one strong editor
had taken the whole thing into hand. The most egregious example of
blatant contradictions occurred when the court warned that judges must not
play editor, 32 but elsewhere concluded that whether the published material
had social value must always be an important consideration in finding the
balance between privacy and liberty.1
33
If the business of the law is to make sense of the confusion of human
life, Shulman falls far short. Although attempting to bring aid to a society
hungry for a rule of what is and what is not "newsworthy," it instead added
another hurdle of confusion and contradiction on the path to understanding.
The opinion is a strong argument that generalization in this charged field is
simply impossible. A better course, it appears, is to proceed as before, case
by case, carefully picking our way among the facts with no grand motto as
a guide. Perhaps, the disappointment caused by Shulman is not the fault of
the law or even the California Supreme Court, but merely the inevitable
result of expectations of the law that are too high.
132. 1d. at 487.
133. Id. at 482.
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